Q1 2024 Internet disruption summary

Causes behind the quarter's disruptions

A mix of physical, political and technical failures drove the first quarter's outages. Damage to terrestrial and submarine cables produced problems in a number of locations, while military action tied to ongoing geopolitical conflicts affected connectivity elsewhere. Governments in several African countries and in Pakistan ordered shutdowns that fell heavily on mobile connectivity. Cyberattacks claimed by the group Anonymous Sudan disrupted connectivity in Israel and Bahrain. Maintenance work and power outages pushed users offline and showed up as drops in traffic. More unusually, RPKI, DNS and DNSSEC issues disrupted subscribers across multiple providers.

This overview is a summary of observed disruptions only; it is neither exhaustive nor a complete list of the quarter's incidents.

Tracking these events now draws on both traffic and routing perspectives. Recent Cloudflare Radar functionality makes it possible to examine disruptions at the network and location level through BGP announcements as well as through traffic, across a network that spans more than 310 cities in over 120 countries and interconnects with more than 13,000 network providers.

Fibre and submarine cable failures

Chad: a cut in Cameroon and a second hit

Moov Africa Tchad customers faced connectivity problems after fibre damage reported in Cameroon on January 10. The provider’s own social media post attributed the outage to a cut in the optical fibre arriving from Cameroon, noting that the path from Sudan had already been unavailable for some time. Whether the damage itself occurred in Cameroon or Chad was not established, and the Sudan reference may point to the cable issue covered in our Q4 2023 summary. Chad, being landlocked, has no choice but to reach the Internet overland, and the AfTerFibre map shows how few routes it has: essentially Cameroon and Sudan.

Traffic at Moov Africa Tchad fell for more than 12 hours beginning around midday UTC on January 10, and the effect was also visible in country-level data. The volume of announced IPv4 address space fluctuated repeatedly at both network and country level while the disruption lasted. A milder event followed on the morning of January 11 (UTC), reportedly an alleged cyberattack by Anonymous Sudan on AS328594 (SudaChad Telecom), an upstream provider for Moov Africa Tchad.

Orange Burkina Faso

A roughly 30-minute outage at AS37577 on February 15 was complete: the network announced no IPv4 address space at all for its duration. Orange Burkina Faso attributed the incident to a fibre cut in a social media communiqué but did not say whether the damage was local or affected one of the terrestrial fibres crossing the country.

MTN Nigeria

MTN Nigeria reported on February 28 that multiple fibre cuts had caused a major service outage affecting both voice and data. A published report described millions of customers hit nationwide over the hours-long outage, with Lagos particularly affected. The disruption ran about seven hours, from 13:30 to 20:30 local time (12:30–19:30 UTC), and MTN confirmed full restoration shortly before midnight local time.

Digicel Haiti

On March 2/3, AS27653 went through a 16-hour disruption caused by a double fibre cut tied to violence surrounding attempts to remove Prime Minister Ariel Henry. A complete outage began around 22:00 local time on March 2 (03:00 UTC on March 3) and lasted roughly nine hours. During that window the network announced neither IPv4 nor IPv6 address space, effectively vanishing from the Internet. Traffic then recovered for about two and a half hours before a near-complete disruption that lasted another three hours.

SKY (Philippines)

SKY (AS23944) reported a fibre cut affecting services in Marikina, Pasig and Quezon City on March 18, listing 45 affected areas in its advisory. Traffic suffered most between 20:00 and 21:00 local time (12:00–13:00 UTC), with full recovery taking several more hours. Routing impact was minor.

Multi-country submarine cable incidents

West Africa, March 14

Rock falls on the seabed were cited as the cause of damage to several submarine cables off West Africa on March 14. Beyond Internet access, the incident also caused availability problems for Microsoft Azure and Office 365. The cables affected were ACE (Africa Coast to Europe), SAT-3/WASC, WACS and MainOne, and 13 countries were impacted: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, South Africa and Togo.

Niger, Guinea and Gambia saw comparatively short outages that ranged from under an hour to about two hours. Togo, Liberia and Ghana were affected over multiple days, and in Ghana traffic took several weeks to return to prior peak levels. Operators in the region rerouted traffic onto Google’s Equiano cable, where a 4x traffic increase was reported, and onto Maroc Telecom West Africa. SAT-3 service was fully restored as of April 6, ACE repairs were completed on April 17, and WACS and MainOne repairs were expected by April 28.

Red Sea, February 24

Three cables running through the Red Sea — Seacom/Tata, Asia Africa Europe-1 (AAE-1) and Europe India Gateway (EIG) — were damaged on February 24. It is believed the anchor of the Rubymar, a cargo ship struck by a ballistic missile on February 18, severed them. Seacom confirmed the damage to its own cable; the owners of AAE-1 and EIG did not publish similar confirmations. East African countries including Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Mozambique were reportedly impacted, but Cloudflare Radar showed no loss of traffic in those countries.

Sudan: three carriers hit as data centers are seized

Cloudflare recorded traffic losses at three Sudanese providers in early February. AS15706 (Sudatel) lost traffic on February 2, AS36972 (MTN Sudan) on February 7, and AS36998 (Zain Sudan / SDN Mobitel) saw a similar loss on the same day. MTN Sudan's disruption lines up with a social media post from the operator stating (translated) that all services had been interrupted “due to circumstances beyond our control” and promising restoration as soon as possible.

Zain Sudan acknowledged its own outage on February 5, several days after it began, saying (translated) that the “current network outage is due to circumstances beyond its control” and hoping safety would prevail. Sudatel shared nothing about its network status. On February 4, Digital Rights Lab - Sudan posted on social media that its sources had confirmed @RSFSudan forces took over ISPs' data centers in Khartoum. The observed outages are likely tied to those takeovers, part of the military conflict under way in the country since April 15, 2023.

Recovery differed by operator. Sudatel traffic started returning on February 11. At Zain Sudan, traffic began to come back on March 3, corroborated by a post stating (translated) that the Zain network was “gradually returning to work” with free communication for subscribers for a limited time, and that work would continue in the remaining states. MTN Sudan traffic had still not returned by the end of the quarter.

Ukraine: strikes on energy infrastructure cascade to connectivity

February marked two years of the Ukraine/Russia war, a period in which conflict-related attacks have caused repeated Internet outages in Ukraine. On February 22, Russian air strikes on critical infrastructure damaged energy facilities across the country, producing widespread power outages. Internet disruptions followed in multiple regions, including Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and Khmelnytskyi Oblast. Traffic first dropped around 05:00 local time (03:00 UTC), falling as much as 68% in Kharkiv, and all regions saw lower traffic levels for several days compared with the previous week.

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Gaza Strip: Paltel outages from hours to over a week

Paltel (Palestine Telecommunications Company) had published several social media posts about disruptions to its landline, mobile, and Internet services throughout October, November, and December, as noted in the Q4 2023 disruption summary. Comparable outages appeared in the first quarter of 2024, on January 12, January 22, and March 5. Paltel attributes them to the ongoing aggression related to the war with Israel.

Outage lengths varied from a few hours to more than a week. The graphs below show Paltel traffic across four Palestinian governorates in the Gaza Strip. The Gaza governorate appears to have suffered a disruption while connectivity remained available, whereas complete outages occurred in Khan Yunis, Rafah, and Deir al-Balah.

January 12-19

January 22-24

March 5

Cyberattack-driven disruptions

Beyond the January 11 attack that affected connectivity for AS327802 (Moov Africa Tchad / Millicom), several other first-quarter disruptions were caused by cyberattacks.

HotNet Internet Services (Israel)

Anonymous Sudan reportedly attacked AS12849 (HotNet Internet Services), a major Israeli telecommunications provider. The disruption was brief, affecting traffic only from 22:00 on February 20 to 00:00 on February 21 local time (20:00 to 22:00 UTC on February 20). Despite its short duration, the attack took the provider offline: the volume of IPv4 and IPv6 address space announced by HotNet fell to zero for the period of the attack.

Zain Bahrain

Anonymous Sudan also reportedly targeted AS31452 (Zain Bahrain). This attack appeared less severe than the HotNet one but lasted considerably longer, with traffic disrupted from 20:45 on March 3 to 18:15 on March 4 local time (17:45 on March 3 to 15:15 on March 4 UTC). No impact on announced IP address space was observed. Zain Bahrain acknowledged the disruption in a March 4 post, noting (translated) that some customers might encounter difficulties using some services and that its technical team was working to resolve them as quickly as possible.

Ukrainian providers

On March 13, an attack targeted several Ukrainian telecommunications providers, including AS16066 (Triangulum), AS34359 (Link Telecom Ukraine), AS197522 (Kalush Information Network), AS52074 (Mandarun), and AS29013 (LinkKremen). Triangulum was the most affected, with a near complete loss of traffic between March 13 and March 20. The company posted a notice on its website describing a hacker attack on a number of Ukrainian providers and a large-scale technical failure on its network at 10:28 a.m. on March 13, 2024, after which electronic communication services could not be provided. Staff, together with the Cyber Police and the National Cyber Security Coordination Center, are taking round-the-clock measures to restore the full range of services, which are being recovered gradually and may take several days to fully return.

Other affected providers saw shorter disruptions. Mandarun's near complete outage lasted roughly a day, while the rest experienced outages of about seven hours, starting around 11:30 local time (09:30 UTC) on March 13 and returning to typical levels around 08:00 local time (06:00 UTC) on March 14.

State-ordered shutdowns

Comoros: post-election disruption

After protests broke out against the re-election of President Azali Assoumani, authorities in Comoros reportedly shut down Internet connectivity on January 17. Country-level traffic showed some disruption between 12:00 local time on January 17 (09:00 UTC) and 17:30 local time on January 19 (14:30 UTC), but the effect was far clearer in traffic from AS36939 (Comores Telecom), which went through several near-complete outages over that two-day window. Comores Telecom announces only a small amount of IPv4 address space, and that space was highly volatile on January 17 and 18, dropping to zero repeatedly.

Senegal: two mobile suspensions a week apart

On February 4, Senegal's Minister of Communication, Telecommunications, and Digital Affairs ordered mobile Internet connectivity suspended from 22:00 local time (22:00 UTC), following protests over the postponement of the presidential election. Traffic from AS37196 (Sudatel Senegal/Expresso Telecom) dropped sharply when the suspension took effect and recovered around 07:30 local time (07:30 UTC) on February 7. Traffic from AS37649 (Tigo/Free) fell around 09:30 local time (09:30 UTC) on February 5, after the provider notified subscribers of the suspension on social media; it recovered around midnight local time (00:00 UTC) on February 7, when the provider again used social media to report that service was available. Neither provider's announced IP address space changed, indicating the suspension was not imposed at the routing level.

On February 13, the government ordered a second mobile suspension, aimed at preventing "the spread of hateful and subversive messages online" ahead of a march by activist groups opposing the election postponement. This one was most visible on Tigo/Free, which saw a significant disruption between 10:15 and 19:45 local time (10:15 - 19:45 UTC).

Pakistan: election-day mobile cut

The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) had said Internet services would stay available as citizens voted on February 8. On the day itself, however, Pakistani authorities cut mobile Internet access nationwide as voters went to the polls, citing the need "to maintain law and order" after violence the previous day. The impact was visible across multiple providers in Pakistan, including AS59257 (Zong/CMPak), AS24499 (Telenor Pakistan), and AS45669 (Jazz/Mobilink), running from 07:00 to 20:00 (02:00 - 15:00 UTC), with traffic returning to expected levels about nine hours later. A post on the Internet Society's Pulse blog estimated the shutdown cost Pakistan nearly USD $18.5M in lost Gross Domestic Product.

Chad: a week of intermittent cuts

Chad saw several Internet disruptions between February 28 and March 7, in the wake of political violence in the country. The first began at 10:45 local time on February 28 and ran until 18:00 local time on March 1 (09:45 on February 28 - 17:00 on March 1). Shorter disruptions lasting a few hours each followed on March 3, 4, and 7. Announced IPv4 address space aggregated across the country's networks dropped noticeably alongside the February 28, March 3, and March 4 shutdowns; it is not clear why no similar drop occurred on March 7.

Power grid failures and cyber incidents

Tajikistan

A country-wide power outage struck Tajikistan on March 1, beginning around 11:00 local time (06:00 UTC) and lasting roughly three hours. Reporting linked the disruption to a possible spike in electricity use by heaters as temperatures across the country approached freezing. Although power came back around 14:00 local time (09:00 UTC), Internet traffic stayed below expected levels until about 05:00 local time the next day (midnight UTC on March 2). Beyond the usual traffic loss from powered-down computers and routers, the outage also affected in-country network infrastructure: the aggregate volume of announced IPv4 address space from the country dipped slightly while power was out.

Tanzania

On March 4, the Tanzania Electricity Corporation (TANESCO) announced on social media that an error in the National Grid system had left parts of the country, including Zanzibar, without electricity. The notice stated (translated) that the organization's experts were working to restore normal service and apologized for the inconvenience. Internet connectivity in Tanzania dropped between 13:30 and 23:00 local time (10:30 - 20:00 UTC).

Orange España and the RPKI fallout

Internet routing depends on BGP, which historically relied on trust between providers; mechanisms such as RPKI were later developed to prevent abuse. RPKI cryptographically signs records associating a BGP route announcement with the correct originating AS number, and ROA records let address block holders authorize an AS to originate routes to their prefixes. Correctly configured, RPKI and ROAs help block BGP hijacking. RIPE NCC, one of five Regional Internet Registries, handles resource allocation and registration for Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia.

On January 3, an attacker exploited weak account security at RIPE and weaker security at AS12479 (Orange España), logging in with credentials found on the public Internet. The attacker then published multiple ROAs with bogus origins, making thousands of AS12479 routes RPKI-invalid and prompting carriers that reject such routes to stop carrying much of Orange España's IP space. Cloudflare enforces RPKI validation, so it also rejected the invalid routes; traffic would have been dropped inside transit providers performing the same validation. From Cloudflare's vantage point, traffic from Orange España fell between 16:45 and 19:45 local time (14:45 - 17:45 UTC), alongside a marked drop in announced IPv4 address space from AS12479.

Orange España confirmed the account compromise on social media, and RIPE subsequently made 2FA mandatory on its access accounts. Detailed analyses and timelines were published by Doug Madory at Kentik and Ben Cartwright-Cox at bgp.tools.

MaxNet (Ukraine)

Subscribers of AS34700 (MaxNet) in Ukraine lost Internet access for nine hours on January 11. Traffic began dropping around 16:00 local time (14:00 UTC) and recovered around 01:00 local time on January 12 (23:00 UTC on January 11). The provider explained on social media (translated) that a utility malfunction had flooded one of its hub sites, leaving parts of the city partially or completely without service, and later posted that connectivity was restored. Core routing appears to have been hit as well: IPv4 address space announced by MaxNet fell to zero between 16:00 and 22:00 local time (14:00 - 20:00 UTC).

DNS faults and access disruptions

Plusnet (United Kingdom)

On January 15, AS6871 (Plusnet) described a disruption in the United Kingdom as a "mass outage" in replies to customers on social media. The cause proved less dramatic: problems with the provider's DNS servers. With Plusnet's default resolvers unable to resolve hostnames, traffic from the network fell for about two hours between 16:00 and 18:00 local time (and UTC). Users pointing at third-party resolvers such as Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1 saw no disruption.

Russia's .ru DNSSEC failure

A reported DNSSEC failure on January 30 made .ru domains unreachable for several hours. DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records so a response can be verified as coming from the authoritative name server and unaltered en route. The validation failure produced SERVFAIL responses for hostnames in the .ru ccTLD on Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1 resolver, peaking at 68.4% of requests. The Coordination Center for the .ru ccTLD confirmed it was addressing a "technical problem affecting the .ru zone associated with the global DNSSEC infrastructure" but gave no root-cause detail, such as a possible DNSSEC key rollover issue. The zone suffered a similar DNSSEC-related outage for several hours on August 16, 2019.

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AT&T (United States)

Mobile service interruptions hit AT&T subscribers in several U.S. cities from just before 04:00 Eastern / 03:00 Central (09:00 UTC) on February 22, affecting locations including Atlanta, Houston, and Chicago for roughly eight hours. Cloudflare data showed AT&T (AS7018) traffic dropping as much as 45% in Chicago and 18% in Dallas versus the previous week. AT&T's network update attributed the outage to "the application and execution of an incorrect process used as we were expanding our network, not a cyber attack."

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Maintenance-driven outages

Vodafone Egypt

Between 05:15 and 11:30 local time (03:15 - 09:30 UTC) on March 5, customers of AS36935 (Vodafone Egypt) saw mobile Internet disruptions, with traffic dropping as much as 70% below expected levels. A translated post from the operator said some areas were affected by difficulties operating the 4G service "due to updates that took place this morning." Vodafone was required to compensate affected customers and was fined by Egypt's National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA) over the outage.

Ocean Wave Communication (Myanmar)

Just before noon local time (05:15 UTC) on March 12, traffic dropped sharply on AS136442 (Ocean Wave), a consumer fiber and business ISP in Myanmar. The provider told customers (translated) that there would be no Internet or a slow connection due to network maintenance. The disruption lasted about seven hours, with traffic back to typical levels just before 19:00 local time (12:15 UTC).

Submarine cables and operational security

Two damaging submarine cable events stood out during the quarter. Both underscored how much protection submarine cables require and how much risk comes with routing them through or near geopolitical hotspots. With Internet traffic so dependent on submarine cables, that exposure is not going away.

The Orange España incident pointed at a simpler failure: operationally important resources need multi-factor authentication, an argument Cloudflare has made before. Organizations such as RIPE act behind the scenes but remain essential to how the Internet works. Arguably, that position obligates them to adopt every practical safeguard so attackers cannot get in and take actions that ripple broadly across connectivity.