Quad9, the Swiss non-profit foundation, has announced it will pull its free public DNS resolver out of France. The move follows months of litigation and a French court ruling that imposed daily financial penalties on the organization for refusing to block domains linked to alleged copyright infringement. Faced with a choice between crippling penalties and altering its service in ways that would undermine user privacy and security, Quad9 chose to exit the market instead.

Why a vanishing resolver matters

Removing a basic infrastructure service from an entire country is a loss for the open Internet, and it carries immediate practical risk. Quad9's resolver is used across France by individuals as well as government bodies, educational institutions, hospitals, and utilities. Because the service is designed to preserve user privacy, Quad9 cannot identify its users or notify them directly that the resolver will soon stop working. Affected parties who do not switch resolvers in time will simply find that their Internet fails, with no explanation. Devices hardwired to use Quad9 — security systems and thermostats, for instance — may be slow or even impossible to fix.

Quad9 is not the first resolver to leave a country after blocking orders, and it likely will not be the last. Cisco previously withdrew its OpenDNS resolver from France, Portugal, and Belgium (the last temporarily) under similar circumstances. A Belgian court has also issued an order that would impose substantial penalties on Cloudflare, Google, and Cisco unless they begin blocking websites through their public resolvers by early January 2027 — something Cloudflare has never done. Cloudflare, Google, and Cisco have appealed that order, hoping for a resolution before the end of the year.

What a DNS resolver actually does

DNS is the Internet's address book: when a user enters a domain name, the system translates it into the IP address the device needs. A resolver is the service that performs the lookup and returns the address, akin to a directory operator finding a phone number. Resolvers are run by ISPs, mobile networks, businesses, and universities, and most users at home are on their ISP's default resolver. Since the resolver sees all browsing activity, the choice of resolver has real privacy implications.

Public resolvers offer an alternative. Cloudflare launched 1.1.1.1 in April 2018 as a fast, reliable, privacy-first service that collects no user data, and it ranks among the fastest resolvers in the world, including in Europe. Well-known peers include Quad9's 9.9.9.9, Google's 8.8.8.8, and Cisco's OpenDNS. Offering such a service for free is no small feat: a global public resolver must securely handle hundreds of billions or even trillions of queries per day across hundreds of server locations. Users can switch resolvers easily, and many do so for performance, reliability, or security features — including moving to anonymous services with unknown or undocumented practices.

The case against blocking at the resolver

Rightsholders have a legitimate interest in fighting piracy, but public DNS resolvers are the wrong place to do it. For one thing, blocking there is ineffective. A resolver can only decline to return a site's IP address; it cannot remove infringing content or take down the servers hosting it. Returning to the directory analogy, forcing the operator to cross a business's name out of the phone book does not close the business. Bypassing a resolver block takes under a minute — a user can switch to one of thousands of other resolvers, and anyone who knows the underlying IP address does not need a resolver at all. There is no evidence that resolver blocking reduces total online infringement.

Blocking is also a blunt instrument. DNS works at the domain level, so a resolver cannot block a single video or file; it must block the whole domain, legal content included. The block is opaque to users: the site simply fails to load, with no legal notice or explanation, leaving people unable to tell a court order from an outage.

The problem is worse for public resolvers because they operate globally. Blocking imposed in one country naturally crosses borders, letting a single jurisdiction dictate access elsewhere. The EU-dedicated resolver DNS4EU, operated by Whalebone, blocks in response to country-specific orders but applies them across the entire EU. Reengineering public resolvers for localized blocking would fundamentally alter the service, harming performance and resilience, undermining privacy, and fragmenting the open Internet.

Cloudflare, Google, Cisco, and Quad9 have all opposed resolver-blocking mandates, with some success. German courts previously sided with Cloudflare and Quad9 in rejecting such demands. More recently, a French court declined to penalize Cloudflare for not blocking through 1.1.1.1, finding that actions taken through its CDN and reverse-proxy service satisfied the underlying order. Rightsholders have pressed on regardless. A recent study found that most online piracy in Europe is hosted in Europe — suggesting that demands on hosting providers to remove pirated files would be a far more effective focus.

The cost of pushing resolvers out

The French penalty order against Quad9 is the culmination of these efforts. As a small non-profit offering only a resolver, Quad9 had no other way to demonstrate compliance, so the court granted penalties for non-compliance, leaving the organization to degrade its own service or leave.

Driving Quad9 out does nothing to prevent infringement while leaving users with fewer safe, reliable options — particularly ones that also block phishing and malware. Users pushed off established resolvers may fall back on ISP defaults that monetize browsing data, turn to lesser-known resolvers run by anonymous or less trustworthy operators, or run their own. The irony is that Quad9 and Cloudflare are in court precisely because they are transparent, reputable organizations; penalizing transparency only pushes users toward less accountable corners of the web.

Where this goes next

Quad9's announcement should serve as a wake-up call: pursuing blocking at every layer of the Internet carries real costs. A more durable approach is to pursue removal at the hosting provider, which addresses infringement at the source and avoids collateral damage to the Internet. Cloudflare says it will keep resisting resolver-blocking mandates and continues to pursue collaborative efforts against abuse, while warning that further forced withdrawals would cause serious disruption.