Cloudflare was notified on January 23, 2025 through its Bug Bounty Program of a flaw in its Mutual TLS (mTLS) implementation involving session resumption handling. The issue is tracked as CVE-2025-23419 and was mitigated within 32 hours of the report. Cloudflare says its investigation found no evidence that the vulnerability was actively exploited.
Customers using Cloudflare's API Shield together with WAF custom rules that validated the issuer's Subject Key Identifier (SKI) were not affected. Access policies such as identity verification, IP address restrictions, and device posture assessments were also not vulnerable.
How the flaw worked
mTLS extends the standard TLS handshake so that both sides authenticate: the server presents its certificate, and the client presents its own, which the server verifies before the connection completes. Customers can deploy mTLS through API Shield with Custom Firewall Rules or through the Cloudflare Zero Trust suite. Cloudflare terminates the TLS session with the client and passes the client certificate to the Firewall or Zero Trust products, where customer policies are enforced.
Session resumption reduces handshake latency and resource use by streamlining repeat handshakes after trust has already been established, typically via session IDs (server-side cached state keyed to an ID presented in the ClientHello) or session tickets (an encrypted session context sent to the client for later replay). A resumed mTLS session relies on previously established trust.
According to the bug bounty report, a client holding a valid mTLS certificate for one Cloudflare zone could use that certificate to resume a TLS session with a different Cloudflare zone using mTLS, without authenticating the certificate against the second zone.
Cloudflare's TLS library, BoringSSL, stores the client certificate from the original full handshake in the session and, on resumption, does not revalidate it against the full chain of trust, treating the original verification status as authoritative. BoringSSL offers an API to partition session caches and tickets across application-defined contexts, but Cloudflare's use of that API was incorrect, which permitted sessions to be resumed when they should not have been.
The researcher set up two proxied zones with mTLS enabled, authenticated to the first with a valid client certificate, and received a session ticket for that zone. They then changed the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) and HTTP Host header to target the second, unauthenticated zone and presented the ticket during the handshake. Cloudflare resumed the session against the second zone and reported the cached certificate's verification status as successful, bypassing the mTLS authentication normally required to open a session.
Additional validation methods in API Shield or Access policies — issuer SKI checks, identity verification, IP restrictions, device posture assessments — continued to function as intended. The mTLS check itself, however, returned a passing result without re-evaluating the full certificate chain.
Fix and hardening guidance
Cloudflare has disabled TLS session resumption for every customer with mTLS enabled, so sessions that cache client certificates and their verification status can no longer be resumed. The company says it is exploring ways to restore the performance benefits of resumption for mTLS customers.
For further hardening and logging, Cloudflare points customers to Transform Rules, logging, and firewall features. Operators may also add origin-side monitoring to enforce stricter authentication policies.
All mTLS customers can enable additional request headers through Managed Transforms, which pass client certificate metadata to the origin. Enterprise customers can also add these headers through the Custom Fields feature of Cloudflare Log products.

Customers already logging this data at the origin or via Cloudflare Logs can retroactively look for unexpected certificate hashes or issuers that did not trigger any security policy. The same fields can be used in WAF custom rules for additional checks; validating the issuer's SKI, for example, adds another layer of protection, and customers who enabled that check were not vulnerable.
Disclosure and timeline
Cloudflare credits Sven Hebrok, Felix Cramer, Tim Storm, Maximilian Radoy, and Juraj Somorovsky of Paderborn University, who reported the issue through the HackerOne Bug Bounty Program. The company apologized to mTLS customers and said it has implemented additional safeguards to prevent similar issues. All timeline entries are in UTC:
- 2025-01-23 15:40 – Cloudflare notified of the vulnerability in Mutual TLS involving session resumption.
- 2025-01-23 16:02 to 21:06 – Vulnerability validated; release prepared to disable session resumption for Mutual TLS.
- 2025-01-23 21:26 – Remediation rollout begins.
- 2025-01-24 20:15 – Rollout complete; vulnerability remediated.



