Traffic collapse and the routing signal that preceded it
Protests that began in late December 2025 over inflation, food prices and currency depreciation had, by the start of 2026, widened into demands for a change of leadership. Iran has cut connectivity during past unrest: a shutdown lasting more than five days followed the November 2019 fuel-price protests, and services were disrupted across multiple network providers after the September 2022 death of Mahsa/Zhina Amini in police custody. Lower traffic volumes were already observed at the start of this year, hinting at trouble before the full cutoff.
Peak traffic recovered by January 5 and exceeded expected levels in the days that followed, but the recovery was short-lived. The first concrete signal came from routing on January 8: at 11:50 UTC (15:20 local time), the IPv6 address space announced by Iranian networks fell 98.5%, from over 48 million /48s (blocks of 2^80 IPv6 addresses) to just over 737,000. Announced address space shrinking means the announcing networks stop telling the world how to reach those addresses — a major drop can indicate an intentional disruption, because no path to the affected clients or servers remains.



Overall traffic from the country then declined rapidly. Between 16:30 and 17:00 UTC (20:00–20:30 local time), volumes fell nearly 90%, driven by loss of traffic from major providers including MCCI (AS197207), IranCell (AS44244) and TCI (AS58224).

By roughly 18:45 UTC, traffic from Iran had dropped to effectively zero — a complete national shutdown and disconnection from the global Internet.

A partial flicker on January 9
Starting around 10:00 UTC (13:30 local time) on January 9, internal data showed an extremely low volume of traffic from Iran, less than 0.01% of pre-shutdown peaks. Access to Cloudflare's public DNS resolver, 1.1.1.1, also appears to have returned around that time, briefly pushing request traffic well above the expected range; only a small amount remained visible once the spike passed.

Several universities saw connectivity briefly restored from about 11:30 UTC (15:00 local time): University of Tehran Informatics Center (AS29068), Sharif University of Technology (AS12660), Tehran University of Medical Science (AS43965) and Tarbita Modares University (AS57745). Whether the restoration was intentional is unclear, and traffic from these networks was gone again after 15:00 UTC (18:30 local time).

Protocol-level shifts that came first
Alongside the lower traffic at the start of the year, human-generated HTTP traffic showed a marked change in version usage at leading providers. On IranCell (AS44244), as much as 40% of requests had used HTTP/3; that fell to 5% at 20:00 UTC (23:30 local time) on December 31 and kept declining over the following days. QUIC usage followed a similar pattern, as it depends on HTTP/3. On TCI (AS58224), HTTP/3 likewise peaked near 40% of requests, then declined from January 1 and dropped below 5% around 07:00 UTC (10:30 local time) on January 3, with QUIC tracking it. MahsaNet, an organization that fights Internet censorship in Iran, suggested the shifts could indicate that "Severe filtering and layered, upgraded whitelisting are clearly evident and being implemented" (translation via X).


Status: still cut off
No significant changes in Iran's Internet traffic have been observed since January 10. The country remains almost entirely cut off from the global Internet, with internal data showing traffic volumes at a fraction of a percent of previous levels.

Cloudflare Radar's Traffic and Routing pages for Iran, along with the top networks view, provide near-real-time insight into these metrics.



