A quiet exam season in Iraq
Cloudflare’s network spans more than 310 cities in over 120 countries, interconnecting with over 13,000 network providers. That breadth gives us a unique view of Internet resilience, and each quarter we track disruptions caused by everything from fiber cuts to state action.
Iraq has historically been a frequent subject of these summaries, with the government imposing daily multi-hour Internet shutdowns during exam periods to prevent cheating. In Q2 2023, the Ministry of Communications briefly refused a request from the Ministry of Education to impose such a blackout, but that refusal was short-lived, and shutdowns resumed two weeks later. Further shutdowns followed in Q3 across multiple weeks in July, August, and September.
For Q4, the third round of 12th grade final exams was scheduled to run from November 13 to November 21, starting at 13:00 local time, per a schedule published on the Iraqi Ministry of Education’s Facebook page.
November 2023 exam schedule in Iraq
However, traffic data for Iraq during that period shows a consistent diurnal pattern with no signs of the disruptions seen in previous rounds. Civil society groups, academic researchers, and Internet analysts that monitor these shutdowns also reported no related traffic drops. It remains unclear whether a shutdown request was submitted and refused again, or whether no request was made at all. Either way, we hope Iraq continues to keep the Internet connected during future exams.
Conflict in Gaza
On October 7, attacks from Hamas launched from the Gaza Strip against southern Israel sparked a new conflict in the region, with Israel officially declaring war the next day. Traffic in both Israel and Palestine spiked almost immediately — roughly 170% above the prior week in Israel and 100% higher in Palestine.
In the hours and days that followed, multiple Palestinian providers saw traffic drop significantly, with many ending up largely or totally offline, likely due to power outages caused by retaliatory Israeli airstrikes. Affected networks included AS42314 (fusion), AS203905 (DCC_North_ASN), AS210974 (AjyalFI), AS60268 (DIGITAL-COMMUNICATION-PALESTINE-ASN), AS60353 (DCC_RAFAH_ASN), AS62027 (DCC_Khanyouns_ASN), AS57704 (SPEED-CLICK-LTD), AS199046 (JETNET), and AS213207 (TechHub-HiNet).
Throughout October, November, and December, Paltel posted multiple times on its official X account about disruptions to its landline, mobile, and Internet services, citing causes such as fiber damage from bombardment and fuel depletion. Posts were made on October 27, October 31, November 16, December 4, December 14, December 20, and December 26. The outages ranged from hours to multiple days, as shown in the graphs below tracking Paltel traffic in four Palestinian governorates in the Gaza Strip.
Cable cuts and theft
Namibia
On November 13, Telecom Namibia (AS36996) reported interruptions to fixed voice and data services in several areas, caused by cable theft. Traffic was disrupted from 13:45 local time (11:45 UTC) on November 13 until 08:30 local time (06:30 UTC) the next day. This was not isolated — the provider posted several more notices about similar thefts in November and December.
Cuba
A day later, on November 14, ETECSA (AS27725) posted about a terrestrial fiber cut disrupting Internet services. As Cuba’s state-owned provider, the cut hit traffic nationwide and at the network level. The disruption was relatively brief, running from 06:30 to 08:15 local time (11:30 to 13:15 UTC), with a follow-up post announcing the restoration of service.
Chad
A near-complete outage in Chad on December 7 and 8 was reportedly due to fiber optic cable cuts in neighboring countries. SudaChad (AS328594) blamed an issue with CAMTEL, a Cameroonian partner. Moov Africa (formerly Millicom Chad) apologized to customers, pointing to “fiber-optic cut in Cameroon and Sudan” as the root cause. Simultaneous cuts in two neighboring countries would be unusual, but routing data shows SudaChad’s two upstream providers are AS15706 (Sudatel) in Sudan and AS15964 (CAMNET) in Cameroon. The three are partners on the WE-AFRICA-NA terrestrial cable, which runs from Port-Sudan in Sudan to Kribi in Cameroon via Chad, though it’s unknown if that system was involved.
The disruption lasted roughly fourteen hours, from 20:00 local time on December 7 until 10:15 local time on December 8 (19:00 UTC to 09:15 UTC), with impact visible country-wide and at SudaChad and several downstream providers.
Kyivstar cyberattack
On the morning of December 12, Ukrainian provider Kyivstar announced it was the “target of a powerful hacker attack,” causing a “technical failure” that made mobile communication and Internet access temporarily unavailable. Kyivstar has faced roughly 500 cyberattacks since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, but this was reportedly the largest yet. A subsequent report cited the head of Ukraine’s SBU cybersecurity department claiming the hackers first attempted penetration in March 2023, gained access by May, and likely had full network access by November.
Recovery took several days. Kyivstar posted on December 15 that “the Internet is everywhere” but warned of slightly reduced speeds. Those posts align with the traffic disruption shown below, which ran from 06:30 local time (04:30 UTC) on December 12 until 14:00 local time (12:00 UTC) on December 15.
Power Grid Failures Hit Several Countries
Brunei
A power outage in Brunei on October 17 disrupted mobile and fixed Internet services for roughly 13 hours. The disruption began around 11:30 local time (03:30 UTC), with traffic returning to expected levels just after midnight local time on October 18 (16:45 UTC). Two Unified National Networks autonomous systems (AS10094 and AS131467) carried lower traffic volumes during the event.
Kenya
A widespread power outage in Kenya on November 11 cut Internet connectivity for approximately seven hours. Kenya Power posted updates on X throughout the evening, first reporting a partial loss of power supply at 20:30 local time (17:30 UTC), then confirming at 23:57 that engineers were working on restoration. A final update on the morning of November 12 stated that normal power supply had been successfully restored in all affected areas.
Curaçao
On November 14, a blackout in Curaçao caused a near complete loss of traffic at Flow Curaçao (AS52233), with significant disruptions at United Telecommunication Services (AS11081) and at a country level. Aqualectra, the local water and power utility, reported that a short circuit in one of the main cables connecting the Nijlweg and Weis substations was responsible, and emphasized that the incident was not due to a lack of production capacity. The disruption lasted from 14:00 until 22:00 local time (18:00 UTC November 14 to 02:00 UTC November 15).
Sri Lanka
After stabilizing its electrical grid following 2022's crisis, Sri Lanka experienced an island-wide power outage on December 9 caused by the failure of a main transmission line. Internet traffic dropped by around 50 percent starting at approximately 16:45 local time (11:15 UTC). Repairs took several hours, with traffic returning to expected levels around 01:00 local time on December 10 (19:30 UTC).
Panama
On December 24, electric distribution company ENSA initially reported an event affecting electrical services to its customers. A follow-up 30 minutes later pointed to an incident in the "National Interconnected System" that spread nationally within an hour. Panama's Internet traffic showed no noticeable impact from the regional power issues, but the loss of traffic aligned with the national growth of the outage, beginning at 11:45 local time (16:45 UTC). Traffic recovered to expected levels at approximately 15:00 local time (20:00 UTC), consistent with ENSA's X post stating that supply to all clients was normalized at 3:12 pm after an event at the transmission level originating in the Panama 1 Substation of ETESA.
Weather-Driven Disruptions
Ukraine
While conflict-related disruptions in Ukraine have been covered in previous quarterly summaries, a major winter storm in November knocked out power to hundreds of towns and villages, damaging electrical infrastructure. The impact was visible as a drop in traffic beginning around 01:00 local time on November 27 (23:00 UTC on November 26) in regions including Donetsk, Kherson Oblast, and Luhansk. Traffic appeared to return to expected levels early on the morning of November 28.
Mexico
Hurricane Otis made landfall near Acapulco on October 25, causing catastrophic structural damage. Reports indicated that more than 10,000 utility poles were destroyed, knocking out power and Internet/communications across the region, with numerous transmission lines, electrical substations, and a power plant also heavily damaged. Internet traffic from Acapulco dropped by around 80 percent as Otis made landfall. Traffic began to show some growth in early November, but peak volumes remained well below pre-hurricane levels through the end of the year. Several large spikes are visible on December 26 and 30, though their cause is unclear. While Acapulco's tourism industry experienced a notable recovery heading into year-end, infrastructure recovery appears to have been slower.
Wildfire Recovery in Hawaii
Wildfires that began on August 7 in Hawaii killed nearly 100 people and destroyed homes, businesses, and infrastructure, causing power outages and disrupting Internet connectivity. Lahaina was among the most impacted areas, with Internet connectivity remaining sparse for weeks. Repair and restoration efforts continued through the fourth quarter, with traffic growing throughout October and peak levels in November and December approaching pre-fire levels.
Maintenance Outages in Yemen
Yemen experienced two maintenance-related Internet disruptions in the fourth quarter. The first lasted over four hours on the morning of November 10, from 03:10 to 07:45 local time (00:10 to 04:45 UTC), following two other disruptions the prior day. The impact was visible at a country level and on PTC-YemenNet (AS30873). Yemen's Public Telecom Corp. attributed the outage to maintenance on the FALCON submarine cable, and GCX, the cable's operator, confirmed scheduled maintenance had been in planning for three months.
The second disruption occurred on December 15 just before 23:00 local time (20:00 UTC). Mosfer Alnomeir, Yemen's Minister of Telecommunication and Information Technology, posted on X that engineers were carrying out "emergency replacement and upgrade work on some service equipment," causing an interruption lasting approximately 30 minutes, after which service was immediately restored. The impact was again visible at both country and network levels.
Network Faults and Their Causes
Optus (Australia)
A mass outage at Australian provider Optus (AS4804) on November 8 began just after 04:00 Sydney time, with connectivity down from 04:30 to 10:00 local time (17:30–23:00 UTC the previous day). Traffic did not return to expected levels until roughly 23:00 local time (12:00 UTC).
More than 10 million customers were affected, along with hospitals, payment systems, and transport networks. In a report to the Australian Senate Standing Committee on Environment and Communications, Optus attributed the cause to approximately 90 PE routers automatically self-isolating after receiving an overload of IP routing information. The overload followed a software upgrade at one of the Singtel internet exchanges (STiX) in North America, one of Optus's international networks. During the upgrade, changes in routing information were received from an alternate Singtel peering router and propagated through multiple layers of the IP Core network, exceeding pre-set safety limits on a significant number of routers at around 04:05 AEDT. The report also detailed recovery efforts and timelines for consumer Internet, DNS, and mobile services.
Telecom Armenia
A failure of international links at Telecom Armenia (AS12297) on November 11 caused a brief disruption beginning at approximately 15:15 local time (11:15 UTC), with short periods of zero traffic. Services recovered to expected levels by 21:00 local time (17:00 UTC). The incident resembled a similar disruption roughly a year earlier. As one of the country's largest providers, the impact was also visible at a national level.
Three UK
A notable drop in traffic was observed between 15:00 and 21:30 UTC on December 1 at mobile and broadband provider Three UK (AS206067). The company acknowledged customer issues and posted several updates on service restoration over the following day, but did not disclose the root cause. A published report indicated that Three UK attributed the problem to a technical issue at one of its data centers, affecting more than 20,000 users.
Telecom Egypt and Regional Providers
On December 5, Telecom Egypt (AS8452) posted on X that a technical malfunction in one of its main network devices caused an Internet disruption on its network that also affected other providers, including LINKdotNET (AS24863), Vodafone Egypt (AS24835), and Etisalat (AS36992), as well as national traffic. The disruption lasted from approximately 14:15 to 00:00 local time (12:15–22:00 UTC). One news report claimed damage to the FLAG and SeaMeWe-4 submarine cables was responsible, but Telecom Egypt later dispelled that claim, stating there was no truth to reports of a submarine cable break.
Topnet (Tunisia)
A reported but unconfirmed DNS server outage at Topnet (AS37705) on December 17 caused a brief Internet disruption for the Tunisian provider's customers, impacting national traffic volumes as well. The incident lasted less than two hours, from 13:00 to 14:45 local time (12:00–13:45 UTC).
Orange Guinée
An unspecified incident on the Orange Guinée (AS37461) network on the morning of December 22 affected Internet connectivity along with telephone calls and text messages. The graph below shows a near-complete outage between 09:15 and 11:30 local time (09:15–11:30 UTC). The provider later posted an update on the restoration of calls, text messages, and Internet access.
Observations and Outlook
The Cloudflare Radar 2023 Year in Review highlighted over 180 major Internet disruptions observed year-to-date through the end of November, though the actual figure was likely closer to 200 by year's end. These posts are not exhaustive; for instance, while the multi-month shutdown in Manipur, India was covered, internetshutdowns.in lists over 90 more smaller localized shutdowns across the country.
With more than 50 countries holding elections in 2024, some governments have historically implemented Internet shutdowns or other connectivity disruptions during voting periods. The Freedom Online Coalition’s Joint Statement on Internet Shutdowns and Elections outlines the detrimental effects of such actions. The Cloudflare Radar team will continue to monitor for election-related shutdowns, sharing observations via the Cloudflare Radar Outage Center, social media, and posts on blog.cloudflare.com.
