Government-directed shutdowns dominate Q3

Cloudflare's network spans more than 300 cities across over 100 countries, interconnecting with more than 12,500 network providers. This breadth offers a unique vantage point on Internet resilience and disruption. The quarterly summaries we have published since early 2022 have evolved alongside Cloudflare Radar; graphs within these summaries now highlight detected "traffic anomalies," and the Radar Outage Center timeline has been enhanced with anomaly notifications. These features were introduced during Birthday Week in late September (details in the announcement post).

During Q3 2023, Iraq again pursued aggressive government-directed Internet shutdowns aimed at curbing exam cheating, while several African nations imposed politically motivated blackouts. Damage to and planned maintenance of submarine cables disrupted connectivity across multiple countries. Wildfires, an earthquake, and power outages in various locations also caused issues, as did an acknowledged cyberattack that led a major US university to disconnect voluntarily. Several other large providers acknowledged network problems without disclosing root causes.

Internet disruptions related to the Israel/Palestine conflict are not covered here, as they began on October 7 in Q4. Those are being tracked with insights on the Cloudflare blog and @CloudflareRadar.

Government-directed shutdowns to prevent cheating on national exams continued to be a recurring theme in Iraq, with multiple rounds affecting connectivity throughout July, August, and September. As seen in prior quarters, these shutdowns are nationwide in scope and of questionable efficacy in stopping cheating.

A continuation of shutdowns that began in June targeted exams for 9th and 12th graders. On ten days between July 4 and July 17, connectivity was cut on AS203214 (HulumTele), AS59588 (ZAINAS-IQ), AS199739 (Earthlink), AS203735 (Capacities-LTD), AS51684 (ASIACELL), and AS58322 (Halasat) across Iraq, excepting the Kurdistan Region. These outages ran from 04:00 to 08:00 local time (01:00 to 05:00 UTC).

A second round of 12th grade exams prompted daily two-hour shutdowns in the Kurdistan Region from August 6 through August 13. Affected networks included AS21277 (Newroz Telecom), AS48492 (IQ-Online), and AS59625 (KorekTel), with traffic cut from 06:00 to 08:00 local time (03:00 to 05:00 UTC), similar to shutdowns in June.

The second round of 9th grade exams drove a week of shutdowns from August 21 to August 29, again cutting connectivity from 04:00 to 08:00 local time (01:00 to 05:00 UTC) across the same networks impacted in July and stretching across Iraq except Kurdistan.

September brought the second round of 12th grade exams, and with them, another round of shutdowns from September 17 through September 30. These affected the same network providers but were shorter, ending at 07:00 local time (04:00 UTC) rather than 08:00.

Political shutdowns across Africa

Several African countries imposed politically motivated shutdowns during the quarter, often in response to civil unrest and disputed elections.

Senegal

Following the arrest of the opposition leader, Senegal's Ministry of Communication, Telecommunications and the Digital Economy ordered mobile Internet disconnections starting July 31. Disruptions were visible on AS37196 (Sudatel Senegal) and AS37649 (Tigo/Free). Shutdowns typically began between 08:00 and 10:00 local time (Senegal is UTC+0) and ran until between midnight and 02:00, with the final shutdown on August 5 ending exceptionally at 22:00.

Ethiopia

Clashes between federal military and local militia in the Amhara region led authorities to shut down mobile Internet connectivity. Cloudflare observed traffic dropping around 21:00 local time (18:00 UTC) on August 2. This was the second such shutdown in Amhara in 2023, following an April 6 blackout after protests over the federal government's move to disband regional security forces. Ethiopia has a history of such actions over several years. Despite calls to restore service, mobile Internet remained unavailable through the end of Q3.

Gabon

In the wake of contentious presidential elections on August 26, Gabon shut down Internet connectivity to "prevent the spread of calls for violence." Traffic fell just before 17:00 local time (16:00 UTC) that day and remained at zero until roughly 07:30 local time (06:30 UTC) on August 30. Connectivity was restored hours after military officers seized power, placing President Ali Bongo under house arrest following the election body's announcement that he had won a third term.

Cable Damage Across Africa

A series of cable faults across Africa throughout the quarter caused varying degrees of Internet disruption. In Cameroon, road maintenance work severed an optical fibre on July 7, leading Cameroon Telecommunications (Camtel) to warn subscribers of voice and data service interruptions. Traffic on AS15964 (CAMNET-AS) fell sharply around 11:30 local time (10:30 UTC) and did not return to normal levels until roughly 18:00 local time (17:00 UTC).

On July 28, damage to the Africa Coast to Europe (ACE) submarine cable in Ivory Coast caused a near-total loss of connectivity in Liberia. The Liberia Telecommunications Authority (LTA) noted that ACE is the "sole source of internet connectivity between Europe and Liberia." Traffic began dropping at 13:00 local time (13:00 UTC) and recovered gradually over several hours, returning to expected levels by around 17:00 local time (17:00 UTC).

More extensive damage occurred on August 6, when an undersea landslide in the Congo Canyon—at the mouth of the Congo River—broke both the West African Cable System (WACS) and the South Atlantic 3 (SAT–3) cables. This affected Internet connectivity in Togo, Benin, Namibia, and the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). The repair ship CS Leon Thevenin took several weeks to arrive at the site, and repairs were reportedly not completed until September 6. During that period, operators rerouted some traffic onto alternate infrastructure, including Google's Equiano cable, which had gone live in February 2023. As a result, the affected countries did not experience a complete loss of traffic; Togo's traffic recovered several weeks before repairs were finished, while impacts on Benin, Namibia, and the Republic of Congo are clearer in shorter-interval graphs that show hourly data aggregation.

Cross-border dependencies were also apparent in South Sudan. Fiber cuts in Uganda on August 14 briefly disrupted service for customers on MTN South Sudan (AS37594) between 13:00 and 15:00 local time (11:00–13:00 UTC), affecting an estimated 438,000 users. The provider apologized on social media, attributing the issues to "multiple fiber cuts in Uganda."

University of Michigan Shuts Down Network

A "significant security concern" prompted the University of Michigan to disconnect the Internet across its Ann Arbor, Flint, and Dearborn campuses starting August 27. The decision, made just before 14:00 local time (18:00 UTC), caused a substantial drop in traffic on AS36375 (UMICH-AS-5) that lasted until just after 08:00 local time (12:00 UTC) on August 30. While classes continued on schedule, the university warned of potential delays in financial aid refunds and the temporary unavailability of certain campus systems.

Wildfire Devastates Lahaina

In early August, a series of wildfires struck Hawaii, hitting the town of Lahaina on Maui particularly hard. The fires killed nearly 100 people and destroyed homes, businesses, and infrastructure, causing power outages and cutting Internet connectivity. Traffic from Lahaina to Cloudflare dropped to near zero around 21:00 local time on August 7 (07:00 UTC August 8) and stayed at minimal levels through August 30. As cleanup progressed, wireless operators deployed temporary network assets, and some recovery of Internet traffic was visible through the end of September.

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Earthquake in Morocco

A magnitude 6.8 earthquake struck Morocco on September 8 at 23:11 local time (22:11 UTC), centered 79 kilometers (49 miles) southwest of Marrakesh. The quake killed nearly 3,000 people and caused significant damage, including the collapse of schools, houses, and historic buildings. Power outages and infrastructure damage led to largely localized Internet disruptions.

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At the country level, Morocco's traffic showed only a nominal loss after the earthquake, remaining slightly below expected levels for about four days. Regional impacts were far more pronounced: Marrakesh-Safi saw an immediate 64% drop in traffic, Souss-Massa also lost 64%, and Casablanca-Settat declined by 49%. Peak traffic in these regions stayed somewhat below previous-week levels for several days following the quake.

Power Outages Take Down National Networks

Several countries experienced significant Internet disruptions during Q3 2023 as a direct result of failures in their national power grids. In most cases, the correlation between electricity loss and traffic drops was immediate and severe.

On July 27, a malfunction at a major Aqualectra Utility power distribution center in Curaçao caused about 70% of neighborhoods to lose power, leading to an island-wide Internet disruption. Traffic fell sharply around 12:30 local time and remained largely flat for approximately five hours before recovery began around 17:30 local time, aligning with a utility announcement that 55% of the island's power supply had been restored. Traffic returned to normal levels by around 22:00 local time.

Brazil experienced a widespread blackout starting at 08:30 local time on August 15. Although the outage represented a loss of roughly 27% of the country's total electric load at the time, the impact on Internet traffic was surprisingly nominal. Traffic recovered to expected levels by approximately 11:30 local time, just three hours after the event began.

Kenya suffered a "system disturbance" at 21:45 local time on August 25, causing a loss of bulk power supply to various parts of the country. Internet traffic dropped accordingly, and multiple updates from Kenya Power tracked restoration progress. Traffic recovered to expected levels by 03:00 on August 27.

French Guiana faced an 11-hour Internet disruption on August 27 caused by a problem at the energy evacuation station connecting Petit-Saut to the Kourou-Saint-Laurent line. Traffic from the country dropped between 11:00 and 22:00 local time before recovering.

A fire at the Tunisian Company of Electricity and Gas power station in Rades caused a widespread power outage in Tunisia on September 20, resulting in an Internet disruption starting at 01:00 local time. Traffic remained lower than expected for approximately five hours, consistent with reports that the outage lasted over four hours in some areas.

Barbados saw a significant drop in Internet traffic starting at 11:30 local time on September 21, following an outage acknowledged by The Barbados Light & Power Company. Power was restored to all customers by 20:00 local time, but Internet traffic had already returned to expected levels around 17:00 local time.

Submarine Cable Maintenance and Repairs

Planned maintenance on undersea cables took two countries completely offline during the quarter, highlighting the fragility of relying on a single international connection.

La Guinéenne de la Large Bande (GUILAB), the company managing Guinea's capacity on the Africa Coast to Europe (ACE) submarine cable, announced planned maintenance between 22:00 on July 14 and 06:18 on July 15 UTC. The work resulted in a complete Internet outage in Guinea, as the ACE cable appears to be the country's sole international connection with no backup submarine or terrestrial connectivity.

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Just days later, Palau in the western Pacific was taken completely offline for several days due to an emergency repair on the SEA-US cable network in Guam. Palau National Communications Corporation (PNCC) warned that repairs on the SEA-US cable, which Palau's own cable network connects to for onward transport to Guam, could only be undertaken when the cable was not powered. During the repair window, the only available international connectivity was a limited-capacity satellite connection. Cloudflare observed no appreciable traffic from that backup connection, with traffic dropping to zero at 07:00 local time on July 18 and remaining there until around 18:00 local time on July 21, when repairs were completed earlier than expected.

Provider-Specific Outages

Separate incidents affected major Internet service providers in the United States, the United Kingdom, and a global satellite provider.

Charter Communications' Spectrum brand experienced an outage on August 17 affecting customers in Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee. The impacts varied by state: Tennessee saw a near-complete outage between 12:30–14:00 local time, Alabama saw brief and intermittent drops, Georgia experienced scattered traffic declines, and Texas — which was not initially cited by Spectrum but was quickly called out by customers — saw a decline at 13:30 local time. Spectrum confirmed around three hours after its initial notice that repairs had been completed and services restored.

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SpaceX Starlink experienced a brief but complete outage on September 12. Traffic from AS14593 (SPACEX-STARLINK) dropped at 23:15 UTC but recovered to normal levels within 90 minutes. Starlink acknowledged the network outage at 00:33 UTC on September 13 and confirmed the issue was fully resolved just over an hour later.

Sky Broadband in the United Kingdom faced a nationwide disruption starting at 21:00 UTC on September 19. Traffic from AS5607 dropped sharply but did not indicate a full outage, with volumes below expected levels lasting until approximately 01:00 UTC on September 20. Sky's support account acknowledged the issue on X/Twitter, but no root cause was ever provided.

Observations and Categorization

This summary covers only the disruptions that were clearly observed and either acknowledged by the impacted provider or evident from traffic data. Some incidents visible in Cloudflare's data were never publicly acknowledged, while others were reported by industry colleagues based on their own measurement methodologies but were not clearly obvious in our traffic graphs. The Cloudflare Radar Outage Center now includes information on both verified outages and observed traffic anomalies, with notifications available for both categories.