Traffic surge, not attack surge, defined Election Day

Requests to state and local government election sites reached roughly 602 million on November 3, up from 130 million two days earlier and the highest daily volume of 2026 for those sites. Across the wider Cloudflare network, traffic grew only 12% over the same window — a 363% increase on election properties set against a much flatter baseline elsewhere.

On Election Day itself, Cloudflare recorded no significant DDoS attack against any of the more than 1,400 election-related websites it protected and saw no escalation in overall attack volume. The only notable DDoS in the immediate run-up came on November 2, when a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives in California absorbed 520,000 requests. Those figures sit far below the Moldovan Election Commission's 2025 experience, when more than 898 million malicious requests landed in a single 12-hour period and peaks hit 324,333 requests per second.

Protection for these sites came through the Athenian Project, Cloudflare for Campaigns, and Project Galileo, whose participants include state and local governments, candidates, political parties, voting-rights advocates, journalists, and civil society groups. The company has run an election protection program since 2016.

Vulnerability probing outweighed denial of service

Across the 12 months before the vote, Cloudflare mitigated 392 million website vulnerability attacks on government election sites — attempts aimed at reaching internal systems and data rather than taking pages offline. Incoming probes arrived at 180 times the rate of DDoS attempts on those same sites, and at roughly ten times the rate seen across Cloudflare's general customer base. The pace accelerated through the year, from 200,000 exploit attempts per day in January to 2 million per day by October, with the heaviest activity several weeks ahead of the election. Common techniques included cross-site scripting, used to plant code and capture administrator credentials or deface content, and SQL injection, which manipulates database queries and could expose voter records.

PHP exploitation on a state voting site

Security researchers disclosed critical PHP flaws, tracked as php2shell, on October 21; the language underpins 70% of the world's websites and the bugs could enable remote code execution, data exposure, or service disruption. Cloudflare had WAF protections in place for all customers before the public disclosure. On October 22, its PHP defenses fired more than 9,000 times against a state government voting website in the Western U.S. That activity was confined to the one site and appears isolated rather than part of a wider campaign.

Email threats against campaigns

For organizations in Cloudflare for Campaigns, 3.9% of email over the 90 days before the election was classified malicious, close to the 4.8% baseline across other customers. Nearly 42% of that malicious mail cleared basic authentication checks such as sender verification or tamper detection in transit, though advanced phishing detection flagged the messages.

DDoS concentration on news and civil society

The attack mix shifts by target type. For journalism and election-focused civil society groups, DDoS dominated: more than 10.8 billion requests mitigated over the year, capped by a 3.04 billion-request attack on a U.S. news organization on September 10, 2026. Earlier Cloudflare research covering Project Galileo entities in 120 countries found DDoS accounted for 81% of all attacks against them.

Guidance drawn from the cycle

  • Size for legitimate spikes. Organic voter interest can drive volumes that overwhelm unprepared infrastructure; scalable, efficient systems should handle Election Day load without straining budgets or staff.
  • Keep defenses running all year. Attacks occurred throughout the cycle rather than during voting windows alone, so protections should not be treated as seasonal.
  • Automate rule updates. AI lowers the effort needed to find and exploit new flaws; services such as managed rules keep protections current by default.

The pattern reversed from previous cycles: attackers pursued access and data rather than outages. With officials, institutions, and voters depending on the internet for election information, stable and accessible digital infrastructure is a civic requirement, not just an IT concern.