Government-directed shutdowns dominated Q3 disruptions
During the third quarter of 2022, Cloudflare observed Internet disruptions across multiple regions, with government-directed shutdowns remaining a recurring cause. These shutdowns affected countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and the Caribbean. The patterns varied from scheduled exam-related blackouts to reactive measures during civil unrest.
Iraq's exam-time shutdowns continue and conclude
The Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq continued its practice of twice-weekly Internet shutdowns, initially reported in our Q2 summary. Implemented to prevent cheating on high school final exams, these disruptions occurred on Mondays and Thursdays from late June through July 21, with one exception. Each shutdown lasted from 0630–1030 local time (0330–0730 UTC) and impacted the Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Duhok Governorates.
Cuba: two distinct disruption events
A short disruption was observed in Cuba on July 15, between 0055–0150 local time (0455–0550 UTC), coinciding with reported anti-government protests in Los Palacios and Pinar del Rio.
Later in the quarter, a more significant outage affected the country starting September 29. Reportedly triggered by protests over electricity shortages in the aftermath of Hurricane Ian, the complete outage ran from 2030 local time on September 29 until 0315 local time on September 30 (0030–0715 UTC).
Kabul connectivity loss
Telecommunications services were reportedly shut down in part of Kabul, Afghanistan, on the morning of August 8. Traffic began dropping around 0930 local time (0500 UTC) and recovered approximately 11 hours later, at about 2030 local time (1600 UTC).
Sierra Leone: two outages during protests
Two separate Internet disruptions were observed in Sierra Leone on August 10 and 11, likely tied to protests in Freetown over the rising cost of living. The first event occurred between 1200–1400 local time (1200–1400 UTC) on August 10. While widely believed to be government-directed to quell demonstrations, Zoodlabs, which manages Sierra Leone Cable Limited, attributed the outage to "emergency technical maintenance on some of our international routes."
A second, longer outage followed on August 11, between 0100–0730 local time (0100–0730 UTC). These actions echo similar government behavior in previous years, when connectivity was cut following national elections.
Somaliland precedes protest with shutdown
Local authorities in Somaliland reportedly cut Internet service on August 11 ahead of scheduled opposition demonstrations. A complete outage was visible in Woqooyi Galbeed between 0645–1355 local time (0345–1055 UTC). The disruption was attributed to traffic loss from two providers: AS37425 (SomCable), which focuses on wireline access, and AS37563 (Somtel), a mobile services provider.
India: exam-related shutdowns and a legal shift
While India has a long history of regional Internet shutdowns—often for administrative reasons such as exam security—the country’s Supreme Court has now ordered the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY) to disclose the legal grounds for imposing or approving such measures. Until that matter is settled, regional shutdowns are expected to persist.
One such example occurred in Assam, where mobile Internet was cut to prevent cheating on job exams. These shutdowns were implemented twice daily on August 21 and August 28. Although officially scheduled from 1000–1200 and 1400–1600 local time (0430–0630 and 0830–1030 UTC), some providers reportedly suspended connectivity earlier in the morning.
Iran: protests trigger curfews and protocol blocks
In late September, protests erupted across Iran following the death of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old woman detained by the "morality police" in Tehran on September 13. She died in custody on September 16. In response, authorities imposed multiple waves of connectivity disruptions.
Beyond multi-hour outages in Sanandij and Tehran province on September 19 and 21, three mobile network operators—AS44244 (Irancell), AS57218 (RighTel), and AS197207 (MCCI)—implemented daily Internet "curfews," typically running from 1600 to midnight local time (1230–2030 UTC). Start times varied on several days, and the regular shutdowns continued into early October.
Access to DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) and DNS-over-TLS (DoT) services was blocked in Iran starting September 20. In a likely related action, connections over HTTP/3 and QUIC were blocked starting September 22.
Earthquakes and storms leave their mark on regional connectivity
Natural disasters continued to be a major source of Internet disruptions in the third quarter of 2022, with earthquakes and hurricanes causing significant damage to power and telecommunications infrastructure.
Papua New Guinea
A 7.6 magnitude earthquake struck Papua New Guinea on September 11, triggering landslides and cracking roads in addition to disrupting Internet connectivity. Traffic to the country dropped by 26% shortly after 1100 local time (0100 UTC) and remained depressed into the following day. Local provider PNG DataCo attributed the outage and degraded service to damage affecting the Kumul Submarine Cable Network (KSCN) Express Link between Port Moresby and Madang, as well as the PPC-1 Cable between Madang and Sydney.
Mexico
Just over a week later, a 7.6 magnitude earthquake struck the Colima-Michoacan border region in Mexico at 1305 local time (1805 UTC). Traffic in the impacted states dropped by more than 50% immediately following the quake, but recovered relatively quickly, returning to expected levels by around 1600 local time (2100 UTC).
The epicenter was located 35 km southwest of Aguililla, Mexico.
Hurricane Fiona
Hurricane Fiona wrought a path of destruction up the east coast of North America in late September, causing Internet disruptions along the way. Island-wide power outages on September 18 disrupted connectivity across Puerto Rico. Traffic volumes took over 10 days to return to expected levels, with local power company Luma Energy providing regular repair updates via its Twitter feed.
Two days later, the storm slammed the Turks and Caicos islands, bringing flooding and significant damage. Traffic there began dropping below expected levels around 1245 local time (1645 UTC) on September 20, with recovery taking approximately a day; traffic returned to normal around 1100 local time (1500 UTC) on September 21.
Hurricane Fiona ultimately made landfall in Nova Scotia, Canada, on September 24. The most significant impact was seen in that province, where power outages disrupted connectivity. As Nova Scotia Power worked to restore service, traffic volumes gradually increased, returning to normal levels by September 29.
Hurricane Ian
Hurricane Ian made landfall in Florida on September 28, becoming the strongest hurricane to hit the state since Hurricane Michael in 2018. More than four million customers lost power, and several cities experienced associated Internet disruptions. Traffic from impacted cities dropped significantly starting around 1500 local time (1900 UTC). Recovery was slow, with traffic levels still below pre-storm volumes more than two weeks later. Affected areas included Sarasota, Naples, Fort Myers, Cape Coral, North Port, Port Charlotte, Punta Gorda, and Marco Island.
Power outages beyond the storms
Several other power-related events caused multi-hour Internet disruptions during the quarter, independent of earthquake and hurricane activity.
Iran
A reported power outage in a key data center building disrupted connectivity for customers of local ISP Shatel in Iran on July 25. Traffic dropped significantly at approximately 0715 local time (0345 UTC), with recovery beginning almost immediately; traffic neared expected levels by 0830 local time (0500 UTC).
Venezuela
Electrical issues frequently disrupt Internet connectivity in Venezuela, with the independent @vesinfiltro Twitter account tracking these events closely. On August 9, electrical issues disrupted connectivity across multiple states, including Mérida, Táchira, Barinas, Portuguesa, and Estado Trujillo. The data shows evidence of two disruptions: the first around 1340 local time (1740 UTC) and a second a few hours later starting at around 1615 local time (2015 UTC). Traffic volumes recovered fairly quickly in both cases.
Oman
A power outage in Oman on September 5 impacted energy, aviation, and telecommunications services. The country's traffic volume dropped nearly 60% when the outage began just before 1515 local time (0915 UTC). Although authorities claimed the electricity network would be restored within four hours, traffic did not fully return to normal until approximately 11 hours later, around 0400 local time on September 6.
Ukraine
In Ukraine, power outages were behind Internet disruptions observed in Kharkiv on September 11, 12, and 13. The first disruption started around 2000 local time (1700 UTC) on September 11, with a near-complete outage lasting just over 12 hours; traffic returned to normal around 0830 local time (0530 UTC) on the 12th. Later that day, another partial outage occurred, with a 50% traffic drop at 1330 local time (1030 UTC), though recovery started approximately an hour later. A nominal disruption was also visible at 0800 local time (0500 UTC) on September 13, with lower-than-expected traffic lasting around five hours.
Terrestrial cable damage
While recent attention has focused on the security of sub-sea cables following the alleged sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, the cable damage disruptions below all involved terrestrial infrastructure.
Iran
On August 1, a reported fiber optic cable problem caused by a fire in a telecommunications manhole disrupted connectivity across multiple network providers, including Aria Shatel (AS31549), TIC (AS58224), Asiatech (AS43754), Irancell (AS44244), and MCCI (AS197207). The disruption started around 1215 local time (0845 UTC) and lasted approximately four hours. Because the impact was felt across major wireless and wireline networks, the effect was visible at the country level.
Pakistan
Cable damage from heavy rains and flooding caused several Internet disruptions in Pakistan in August. The first notable disruption occurred on August 19, starting around 0700 local time (0200 UTC) and lasting just over six and a half hours. Another significant disruption was visible on August 22, starting at 2250 local time (1750 UTC), with a further drop at 0530 local time (0030 UTC) on August 23. This second, more significant drop was brief, lasting only 45 minutes, after which traffic began to recover.
Haiti
Amid protests over fuel price hikes, fiber cuts in Haiti caused Internet outages across multiple network providers. Starting at 1500 local time (1900 UTC) on September 14, traffic on AS27759 (Access Haiti) fell to zero. The provider reported several fiber optic cables cut in various areas of the country, with blocked roads making it difficult for technicians to reach the problem areas. Repairs were eventually made, with traffic starting to increase again around 0830 local time (1230 UTC) on September 15.
Access Haiti provides AS27774 (Haiti Networking Group) with upstream Internet connectivity, so the fiber cut impacted their connectivity as well.
Outage Causes: Declared and Unstated
Not every Internet disruption comes with a clear, immediate explanation. In some cases, the responsible party only offers a vague label like “technical problems” — a term that can cover anything from misconfiguration to faulty routing hardware. In other cases it’s the official government or carrier line for an outage. That was the situation in two notable incidents this quarter.
Rogers, Canada
The most significant disruption of the year so far hit AS812 (Rogers), one of Canada’s largest ISPs, on July 8. Traffic from the network dropped to near zero around 0845 UTC.
Recovery was slow: only small amounts of traffic trickled through during the incident, and it took close to 24 hours for levels to normalize.
A statement from Rogers’ CEO attributed the failure to “a network system failure following a maintenance update in our core network,” which caused some routers to malfunction. The company said it disconnected the affected equipment and redirected traffic while volumes returned to normal. Cloudflare published a real-time analysis of the event, covering the associated BGP activity.
Chad
A four-hour outage in Chad on August 12 cut off nearly all connectivity between 1045 and 1300 local time (0945 to 1400 UTC). Authorities blamed a “technical problem” on links between Sudachad and upstream networks in Cameroon and Sudan.
Incidents Without an Official Cause
Some disruptions leave no paper trail — no provider statement, no government explanation, and no obvious related event. Two such cases stood out this quarter.
On August 11, a multi-hour outage hit Centurylink customers across Colorado, Iowa, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. The drop was visible in traffic for AS209, the associated autonomous system.
Satellite Internet provider Starlink suffered a global outage on August 30. Service was disrupted for roughly four hours, between 0630 and 1030 UTC, before recovering.
Tracking Outages Going Forward
At the end of September, Cloudflare launched the Cloudflare Radar Outage Center (CROC) as part of its Birthday Week. The center, now a section of the Radar 2.0 site, archives observed Internet disruptions and their details. The underlying data is accessible via an API, allowing third parties to build their own monitoring tools. Updates on ongoing incidents and other Internet trends are shared on Twitter via @CloudflareRadar.
