Upcoming Let’s Encrypt certificate chain change and impact for Cloudflare customers

Let’s Encrypt has historically operated two certificate chains: one cross-signed with IdenTrust, a globally trusted CA operating since 2000, and one anchored in Let’s Encrypt’s own root, ISRG Root X1. In the years since Let’s Encrypt launched, ISRG Root X1 has accumulated device compatibility of its own.

That dual arrangement ends on September 30, 2024, when the IdenTrust cross-sign expires. After that date, servers can no longer present certificates signed by the cross-signed chain; every Let’s Encrypt certificate will chain to ISRG Root X1.

Clients released after 2016 are largely unaffected, because their trust stores are upgradeable and will already contain ISRG Root X1. The breakage lands on legacy systems — for example, devices running Android 7.1.1 (released in 2016) or older, which rely exclusively on the cross-signed chain and have no ISRG X1 root in their trust store. Those clients will hit TLS errors or warnings on domains secured by a Let’s Encrypt certificate. Cloudflare’s own analysis of Android traffic found that 2.96% of all Android requests come from devices affected by the change — a substantial share of traffic that would otherwise lose Internet access.

Where Cloudflare controls the CA, Let’s Encrypt is out

Cloudflare has removed Let’s Encrypt as a certificate authority from every flow in which Cloudflare dictates the CA. That covers Universal SSL customers and SSL for SaaS users on the “default CA” option. Starting in June 2024 — one 90-day certificate lifecycle ahead of the cross-sign expiry — certificates up for renewal began migrating to a CA that remains compatible with older devices. Going forward, customers receive Let’s Encrypt certificates only when they explicitly request Let’s Encrypt as their CA.

This mirrors the approach behind earlier efforts such as “No Browsers Left Behind”, which kept clients reachable as SHA-1 was deprecated. Retiring the cross-sign is a necessary step: a more agile PKI ecosystem depends on pushing devices, browsers and clients toward adaptable trust stores. But such changes disproportionately hit users in economically disadvantaged regions where access to newer technology is limited. Cloudflare had previously published a post asking customers to switch CAs if they expected impact, but judging that impact is hard: trust-store incompatibility errors are logged mainly on clients, so domain owners have little visibility, and the absence of requests from incompatible devices today does not guarantee access tomorrow.

What a certificate pipeline has to get right

Cloudflare manages tens of millions of certificates for customers and issues close to 1 million per day. For the pipeline to count as successful, it must meet five goals:

  1. Customers can always obtain a TLS certificate for their domain
  2. CA-related problems have zero impact on a customer’s ability to obtain a certificate
  3. Best security practices and modern standards are applied
  4. The pipeline is optimized for future scale
  5. A wide range of clients and devices is supported

Every certificate issuance and renewal depends on several steps succeeding across multiple parties: the domain owner completing Domain Control Validation (DCV) for each issuance and renewal; the CA verifying the DCV tokens; CAA records being checked so only authorized CAs can issue; and the CA itself being available to issue.

Domain Control Validation without customer effort

Once a request is initiated, the CA returns DCV tokens that the domain owner must publish as a DNS record or HTTP token. If Cloudflare hosts the DNS, it places the CA’s TXT token in the customer’s records automatically. With an external DNS provider, customers can delegate DCV to Cloudflare so renewals proceed without intervention.

CAs verify tokens from multiple vantage points across countries and ASNs to prevent spoofing — checks that could trip a Cloudflare WAF rule and block validation. The WAF and security engine were updated to recognize CA-originated requests so they are never blocked.

Handling CAA records and CA unavailability

Customers with internal or compliance requirements can restrict issuance via CAA DNS records naming the allowed CAs. Cloudflare checks CAA records before requesting a certificate so the correct CA is used. If those records rule out every CA available in the pipeline and the customer has not uploaded a certificate from their chosen CA, Cloudflare adds CAA records on the customer’s behalf so a certificate can still be issued. Preference is honored where possible; otherwise the priority is avoiding an outage.

Cloudflare is not itself a publicly trusted CA, so it depends on its CAs being available — and 100% uptime is not a realistic expectation. Outages happen, and scheduled maintenance is more common still: one CA has roughly four maintenance periods per month. The pipeline therefore keeps multiple CAs ready to issue and spreads load evenly across them to avoid a single point of failure. Latency and error rates are monitored continuously, with automatic failover to another available, performant CA. These systems work well enough that internal teams are no longer paged for these events.

Shorter lifetimes, stricter crypto

Over the past decade the CA/Browser Forum has driven certificate lifetimes down from 5 years to a 90-day norm, shrinking the window in which a compromised key is usable. Cloudflare has made 90 days the default validity period, which forces regular key rotations and motivated tooling such as DCV Delegation that automates frequent renewals. It also lets Cloudflare offer validity periods as short as two weeks for customers who want high-frequency key rotation without risking renewal failures.

This month Cloudflare is adding ECDSA support for certificates issued by Google Trust Services. ECDSA delivers the same security level as RSA with smaller keys, which means smaller certificates, less data exchanged during the TLS handshake, and faster connections.

Scale on both sides of the pipeline

Shorter lifetimes increase issuance volume, so the pipeline must keep getting more robust — but Cloudflare also depends on its CAs scaling alongside it. Each CA Cloudflare integrates with immediately gains one of its largest consumers. Cloudflare holds CAs to high standards and pushes them to scale their infrastructure, which benefits not only its own customers but the Internet at large. The upcoming Let’s Encrypt chain change adds one more pipeline improvement: best-effort device compatibility for all clients.

Picking the chain that matches your audience

The Internet's standards keep improving, and older client software does not always keep up. Availability remains the deciding factor, because a certificate chain that browsers reject leaves users unable to reach the site. When it is time to decide how to handle this change, Cloudflare gives each application owner the option to choose the setup that best fits their own application profile rather than applying a single certificate-chain configuration everywhere.

Details of the change and the migration path are available in the developer documentation.